Jacob Sandum posted a detailed and well-written PoC for the IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974 ) vulnerability found in the Kubernetes ingress-nginx Admission Controller by Wiz (Woogle!). If you are looking for a quick way to reproduce the issue or validate detection and mitigation, take a look:
https://github.com/sandumjacob/IngressNightmare-POCs/blob/main/CVE-2025-1974/README.md

Today, Wiz (Woogle?) released an advisory detailing an attack chain they’ve dubbed IngressNightmare, which, if left exposed and unpatched, can be exploited to achieve remote code execution by unauthenticated attackers. The advisory, covering five separate vulnerabilities, was published after a brief embargo period, once the Kubernetes folks got their patches together.

You can find a brief writeup and search queries for runZero at: https://www.runzero.com/blog/ingress-nightmare/

The researchers who found the Next.js middleware vulnerability (CVE-2025-29927) have released the full paper: https://zhero-web-sec.github.io/research-and-things/nextjs-and-the-corrupt-middleware

Notable is that the auth bypass requires the x-middleware-subrequest value to be one of these two forms:
middleware:middleware:middleware:middleware:middleware OR
src/middleware:src/middleware:src/middleware:src/middleware:src/middleware

Next.js dropped a CVSS 9.1 authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2025-29927) over the weekend. This flaw is trivially exploitable by sending the header `x-middleware-subrequest: true` and causes the request to skip all middleware processing, including any authentication steps.

Shodan reports over 300,000 services with the `X-Powered-By: Next.js` header alone.

You can find links to the advisory and queries for runZero at: https://www.runzero.com/blog/next-js/

Good morning from Bootstrap`25[1] in Austin, Texas! Haroon Meer kicks us off with "Security Products Don't Have To Suck", which makes many great points, but among those that most security industry "awards" are hot garbage play-to-win trophies, run by the same marketing agencies under a dozen aliases (but often the same Google Analytics ID):

1. https://cfp.ringzer0.training/ringzer0-bootstrap25-austin/

Pat Gray, Founder of Risky Business, Joins Decibel as Founder Advisor. Great interview at
https://www.decibel.vc/articles/pat-gray-founder-of-risky-business-joins-decibel-as-founder-advisor

Texas hacker-people - Ringzer0's BOOTSTRAP25 conference is in Austin, Texas one week from today (Friday night mixer, Saturday day conference)! Mixer tickets are $70, full-day conference pass for Saturday (including workshops) is $249. It should be an amazing event and I hope to see you there!

Registration @ https://ringzer0.regfox.com/bootstrap25-austin
Schedule @ https://cfp.ringzer0.training/ringzer0-bootstrap25-austin/schedule/

The worst part of the Unciphered story isn't that accused-rapist Morgan Marquis-Boire was a co-founder and only his alias "Frank Davidson" was known to employees; it is that Eric Michaud co-founded the company with him and conspired to keep the team from knowing about it. Infosec has its pariahs for a reason (Cap'n Crunch, Jacob Applebaum, Morgan Marquis-Boire, and to a lesser degree Christopher Hadnagy): https://archive.ph/IQ7SK

The Tarlogic claim of backdoor functions in the ESP32 Bluetooth firmware seems overblown. The features they identified require privileged code execution and are helpful for improving open source software for these devices.

Useful resources:

- https://darkmentor.com/blog/esp32_non-backdoor/
- https://x.com/naehrdine/status/1898703255883886909
- https://esp32-open-mac.be/ (WiFi, not BT, but similar work)

Hanno Böck (of badkeys.info among other projects) posted an interesting article about OpenID Connect implementations that mix up their public and private keys: https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/909-Mixing-up-Public-and-Private-Keys-in-OpenID-Connect-deployments.html