quote of the day: "anything is a server rack if you are brave enough"
This is the article to send to your IT team when they refuse to enforce boot-time PINs for BitLocker:
Bypassing Bitlocker using a cheap logic analyzer on a Lenovo laptop: https://www.errno.fr/BypassingBitlocker.html by Guillaume Quéré
Unix time stamps in OpenSSL handshakes are borking Windows clock settings https://arstechnica.com/security/2023/08/windows-feature-that-resets-system-clocks-based-on-random-data-is-wreaking-havoc/ by @dangoodin
The idea that random outbound TLS connections to untrusted third parties can reset the OS clock is wild. Possibly exploitable through SSRF vectors?
I love that NiNi Chen's (https://blog.terrynini.tw/) Mikrotik RADVD exploitation involves old-school fun like delay slots, encoding RISC instructions into IP addresses, and flushing the i-cache/d-cache: https://forum.defcon.org/node/245713 (live stream @ https://m.twitch.tv/defcon_dctv_one)
#defconA few of the talks I am looking forward to at #Defcon 31 this weekend:
* "Terminally Owned": https://forum.defcon.org/node/245741
* "Fantastic Ethertypes and Where to Find Them": https://forum.defcon.org/node/245756
* "A Comprehensive Review on the Less-Traveled Road: 9 Years of Overlooked MikroTik Pre-Auth RCE": https://forum.defcon.org/node/245713
* "Mass Owning of Seedboxes - A Live Hacking Exhibition": https://forum.defcon.org/node/245760
if anyone had told 18-yo me that I would be traveling to the same city at the same time for the next 20+ years...
This walkthrough of reverse engineering and then exploiting a RIGOL scope by @krive@fosstodon.org is beautiful, thanks for sharing! https://tortel.li/post/insecure-scope/
Introducing jswzl: In-depth JavaScript analysis for web security testers https://www.jswzl.io/post/introducing-jswzl-in-depth-js-analysis-for-web-security-testers
Congratulations on the launch Charlie Eriksen!
>We used a Google Ads pre-registration campaign to get installs for our app. We paid for 16,171 conversions. We only received 1,371 installs.
Not a great outcome:
https://andreaskambanis.com/google-play-store-pre-registration-campaigns/A neat information leak in browsers that support mDNS-based hostname resolution. The demo brute forces common names + device prefixes/suffixes, but this can be abused for a dozen other things (do you have a specific IoT device on your network? do you use Meraki? etc):
https://fingerprint.com/blog/apple-macos-mdns-brute-force/
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